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COMMENTS 
POLICING THE RATINGS AGENCIES: THE 
CASE FOR STRONGER CRIMINAL 
DISINCENTIVES IN THE CREDIT RATING 
MARKET 
David A. Maas*
“It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.” 
 
—Standard & Poor’s analyst1
The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate how criminal disincentives 
affect the credit ratings agencies.  The Comment explores how the criminal 
law influenced the behavior of the ratings agencies before and during the 
subprime collapse and the credit crisis.  The failures of the ratings agencies 
have led to a widespread push for regulatory reform, but the possibility of a 
targeted criminal law has been largely absent from the scholarly and 
political discourse.  This Comment examines why there have been no 
criminal prosecutions against actors at the ratings agencies, particularly in 
light of their heavily criticized role in the credit crisis.  In finding criminal 
liability difficult to establish under the existing law, this Comment suggests 
that a tailored criminal law targeting the ratings agencies would provide a 
justifiable and powerful control mechanism for high-risk misconduct.  
Although strict civil laws could similarly deter misconduct, compliance with 
and enforcement of civil regulations would be inefficient and expensive. 
 
 
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Pomona College, 2006.  I 
would like to thank my parents for instilling in me a love of learning, and my wife for her 
endless wisdom and immeasurable support. 
1 In a now-infamous email exchange between two Standard & Poor’s analysts, one 
wrote, “It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.”  Another replied, “Let’s hope 
we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters.”  See Andrew Taylor, 
Credit Raters Get Grilled on Capitol Hill, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE  
(Oct. 22, 2008, 3:10 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/ 
2008296967_apmeltdowncreditagencies.html. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When two Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed in July 2007, it quickly 
became clear that investment products tied to subprime mortgage loans 
were overvalued.2  What little was left of the once-booming business of 
structuring complex securities and collateralized debt obligations came to a 
screeching halt.  The market for these investment products dried up and 
investors watched as the ratings agencies finally slashed credit ratings.3  
Unfortunately, for most it was already too late to withdraw.  Investors 
suffered crippling losses on supposedly safe investment products that bore 
the stamps of ratings-agency approval.  How could this have happened?  
Weren’t the ratings agencies supposed to prevent just this kind of market-
wide valuation crisis?  What were these gatekeepers doing with nonpublic 
information if not protecting the investing public?  The ratings agencies 
became the target of scholarly, political, and mass-media censure.4
Despite this widespread and often scathing criticism of the credit 
ratings agencies (CRAs)
  Critics 
began to reevaluate the role of the ratings agencies and how the regulatory 
framework in which they operate did not adequately control misconduct. 
5 for their role in the subprime and credit crises, 
there have been no criminal prosecutions for CRA misconduct.6  The 
ratings agencies have taken a major blow in the court of public opinion,7
 
2 See Paul Tharp, Bad News Bear—Funds Now Worthless, N.Y. POST, July 18, 2007, at 
35.  It was not just high-risk hedge-funds imperiled by the subprime collapse; even money-
market funds were invested in subprime debt.  See David Evans, Money Markets Face New 
Threat—Subprime Crisis Could Hit Them, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at A36. 
 
3 Dow Dips, but NASDAQ Stages a Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at C13 (noting that 
“Standard & Poor’s cut the ratings on 1,713 classes of securities backed by mortgages issued 
in the first six months of [2007]”). 
4 See generally The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007); Editorial, AAA Oligopoly, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 
2008, at A18. 
5 In referring to the CRAs, this Comment limits its scope to the three major players.  The 
ratings industry “is dominated by three agencies—Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors 
Service, and Fitch Ratings.”  David Teather, SEC Seeks Rating Sector Clean-Up, GUARDIAN, 
Jan. 28, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/ 
jan/28/usnews.internationalnews. 
6 See, e.g., Michael Hirsh, Drop Moody’s Into the Volcano: Why Wall Street’s Big 
Ratings Agencies Should Go the Way of Arthur Andersen After Enron, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 
2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/216486. 
7 See, e.g., Barbara Kiviat, The SEC’s Next Challenge: Fixing the Rating Agencies, TIME, 
Apr. 15, 2009, at 24 (noting confidently that “[a]ny list of people and institutions to blame 
for the financial crisis would include credit-rating agencies”).  
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and investor confidence in their ratings has plummeted.8  Civil litigation 
against the CRAs has marched forward: individual investors have sued the 
CRAs in lawsuits for negligence, fraud, and deceit;9 class actions have 
named the CRAs as co-defendants;10 and the federal government has sued 
the CRAs for civil violations.11  The failures of the ratings agencies 
precipitated a push for regulatory reform,12 but the possibility of reshaping 
or strengthening the criminal disincentives that control the ratings agencies 
has not been under serious consideration.13
Not only the CRAs but the entire financial sector faced public and 
academic scrutiny for the credit crisis.  The investing public was furious at 
Wall Street when the economy began to cave in; many wanted heads on the 
chopping block.
  The integrity of our markets is 
so dependent on the good faith of the CRAs that their wrongdoing, which 
we might elsewhere address with civil liability, should face stricter criminal 
disincentives.  The absence of any criminal prosecutions, let alone 
convictions, under the existing law should signal to Congress that the 




8 See Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Triple-A Ratings Grade on a Curve, Making It 
Difficult to Assess Risk, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2007, at B1 (“[I]nvestors across the globe have 
lost confidence in the ratings.”). 
  Many top executives seemed to be in a vulnerable 
9 One enraged former attorney, Ron Grassi, returned to practice and “set up a war room 
in his Tahoe City, California, home to single-handedly take on Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s 
Investors Service and Fitch Ratings.”  See David Evans & Caroline Salas,  
Flawed Credit Ratings Agencies Reap Profits as Regulators Fail Investors,  
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 29, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601101&sid=a6NdKd8CfR2A. 
10 See, e.g., Kevin LaCroix, Subprime Investors Sue Rating Agency, D & O DIARY, June 
8, 2008, available at http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/06/articles/subprime-
litigation/subprime-investors-sue-rating-agency (describing a class action against the CRAs 
alleging failure “to conduct due diligence and willingly assign[ing] the highest ratings to 
such impaired instruments since they received substantial fees from the issuer”). 
11 See Nathan Koppel & Chad Bray, Judge Limits Credit Firms’ 1st-Amendment 
Defense—Ruling in Cheyne Finance Case Lifts Protection for Ratings Not Made Public; 
Moody’s, McGraw-Hill Stocks Fall, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2009, at C3 (describing a 
development in a class action including King County, Washington, as a plaintiff). 
12 See, e.g., AAA Oligopoly, supra note 4, at A18 (discussing the need for reform in a 
regulatory system that functionally only allows three credit ratings agencies to operate).  
13 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Murphy, Concept Release on the Possible Rescission of Rule 
436(g) Under the Securities Act of 1933, FED. REG., Vol. 74, No. 198, 53114–21, Oct. 15, 
2009 (discussing the possibility of eliminating the CRAs’ exemption from Sections 7 and 11 
of the Securities Act of 1933 but making no mention of criminal liability). 
14 See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Being Kept in the Dark on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2007, at C1 (“Every financial disaster deserves a scapegoat, because someone must be 
blamed when bad investments are made. . . .  If the agencies violated their own policies, they 
will be vilified for the conflicts of interest inherent in their being paid by the issuers of the 
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position, widely despised for their complicity.  From an outsider’s 
perspective, it looked like criminal prosecutions might bring some catharsis 
to the investors who suffered catastrophic losses.  But as the crisis wore on 
and court dockets filled up with complex civil cases seeking damages, the 
high-stakes white-collar criminal cases that many anticipated did not 
materialize.15  At first glance, potential white-collar criminal cases looked 
promising.  There were substantial harms caused by decisions and actions 
of high-level market players: the only hurdle for prosecutors was proving 
the requisite mens rea of knowledge or intent.16  And yet only a handful of 
cases went forward.17
This Comment argues that misconduct at the ratings agencies should 
be subject to criminal punishment even absent a mens rea of knowledge or 
intent.
 
18  When the entire investing public bears a risk of catastrophic losses 
for misconduct at the ratings agencies, there should be a strict criminal code 
controlling that conduct.  The integrity of the markets depends on accurate 
credit ratings provided in good faith.  With the stakes so high, criminal 
sanctions are justified both as deterrents and as desert for the wrongdoers.  
Traditional theories of punishment generally fall into two categories: 
(1)°utilitarianism and (2) retributive justice.19
The case for retributive justice is perhaps even stronger with so many 
millions of people suffering harm from the misconduct: not only did 
  From a utilitarian 
perspective, the financial crisis was a perfect opportunity to exact 
punishments that deter future misconduct.  There were market players who 
needed stronger deterrence at all levels of the market, from mortgage 
brokers all the way up to CEOs of bulge-bracket banks. 
 
securities.  If they did not, they will be derided as fools who could not see how risky the 
securities clearly were.  In hindsight, of course.”).   
15 See Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng & Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory Investigations 
and the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 227 (2009) 
(“Despite the number of credit crisis-related investigations that law enforcement agencies 
have opened over the last two years, there have been remarkably few major regulatory 
actions or prosecutions to date.”). 
16 Admittedly, the expense of pursuing a complex white-collar criminal case is another 
factor that plays some role in the decision to bring suit.  See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 235 
(“A number of significant obstacles, including the time and resources necessary to 
investigate and uncover wrongdoing, as well as the difficulty in apportioning blame and 
proving intent to defraud, confront successful law enforcement actions.”). 
17 See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., 2 Face Fraud Charges in Bear Stearns Debacle, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 2008, at Al (describing the criminal case against two hedge fund managers 
at Bear Stearns who were catapulted into the spotlight in July 2007 when their hedge funds 
collapsed). 
18 See infra subpart III.B (recommending a mens rea of recklessness). 
19 See generally SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES § 2 (8th 
ed. 2007). 
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investors around the world suffer huge losses, but also the job market 
constricted, foreclosures skyrocketed, and citizens across the country 
became collaterally damaged.20
This Comment examines why there have been no prosecutions against 
individuals at the ratings agencies.  The ratings agencies have a long and 
storied history in the American markets that dates back more than a 
century.
  The scene was set for a series of heated 
trials to captivate the public consciousness and restore some faith in the rule 
of law.  But as of yet, no high-profile criminal cases have made it onto the 
dockets. 
21
Part III argues that the existing criminal law is not adequately deterring 
misconduct by CRAs.  Subpart III.A will analyze criminal liability under 
the existing law.  This section will focus on the difficulty of establishing 
mens rea and the causation component of criminal liability.  The progress 
of civil suits against the ratings agencies indicates that a prosecutor could 
prove the actus reus
  Part II of this Comment will explain how the CRAs operate, 
paying particular attention to their role leading up to the subprime and 
credit crises.  This section will also describe how flaws in the CRA model 
led to their complicity in the crisis and will briefly outline some of the 
suggestions that scholars and politicians have offered to fix the ratings 
agencies. 
22 elements of a crime.  The case for causation is 
slightly more difficult because there were so many factors at play in the 
decline and fall of the subprime and credit markets.  However, the most 
significant barrier to a criminal conviction is the existing mens rea 
requirement of knowledge or intent.23
After exploring the theories of criminality, subpart III.B will propose a 
stronger set of criminal disincentives.  This section will recommend that 
Congress enact a narrowly tailored federal criminal law targeted at the 
ratings industry.  This Comment argues that such a law would be both more 
efficient and effective than a purely civil regulatory regime, and justifiable 
 
 
20 See Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—Some Thoughts on a “Sustainable” and 
“Organic” Regulatory System, 4 FL. INT’L U. L. REV. 381, 381–82 (2009) (describing the 
crisis’s aftermath, including soaring unemployment, the devastation of retirement savings, 
and the cascading effects in the real estate market). 
21 See Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, 19 FED. RES. BANK 
N.Y. Q. REV., 1, 1–4 (1994). 
22 Black’s Law Dictionary defines actus reus as the “[t]he wrongful deed that comprises 
the physical components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to 
establish criminal liability.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 39 (8th ed. 2004). 
23 See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 243 (noting that in potential criminal cases “attributing 
blame and proving intent to defraud will present significant impediments to law 
enforcement”). 
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under traditional theories of criminal punishment.24  Although a more 
stringent civil regulatory system could deter misconduct by the CRAs, 
compliance with civil regulations would drive up systematic costs.  Strict 
civil regulations are expensive and not necessarily effective.25
II. BACKGROUND 
  Moreover, 
criminal punishment of wrongdoing in the ratings industry is justifiable in 
light of the high stakes.  CRA actors can currently hide behind the 
sophistication of the rating process to defend against a criminal charge that 
requires knowledge or intent.  Thus, I propose a criminal law prohibiting 
misconduct at the CRAs that requires only a mens rea of recklessness. 
The subprime market collapse had immediate consequences on the 
financial sector.  High-powered Wall Street executives were shown the 
door26 and subprime lending shops were shut down.27  Scholars, journalists, 
and politicians collectively tried to explain how the walls came tumbling 
down.28  The causes identified include (1) high-risk, experimental 
structured finance, including complex instruments such as collateralized 
debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities, (2) the iron fist of mark-
to-market accounting, and (3) recklessly loose lending standards.29
 
24 See infra subpart III.C (discussing how utilitarian and retributive theories of 
punishment both support criminalization of CRA misconduct at a lower threshold than the 
existing law requires). 
  In the 
search for villains, most scholars and critics agree that the storm would not 
25 See, e.g., Diarmuid A. Hurley & David Boyd, Sarbanes Oxley Act Section 404: 
Effective Internal Controls or Overriding Internal Controls?, 16.2 FORENSIC EXAMINER 19 
(2007) (finding that Sarbanes-Oxley’s Section 404, “which was intended to create greater 
accountability of top management . . . . morphed into a detailed, cost-prohibitive, and 
ineffective [regulation system]”). 
26 See, e.g., Robin Sidel, Monica Langley, & David Enrich, Two Weeks that Shook the 
Titans of Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2007, at A1 (describing the “dual dramas at 
Citigroup and Merrill [Lynch & Co.]” that saw Stanley O’Neal and Charles Prince, two 
powerful Wall Street figures, forced out the door in the push for accountability). 
27 See Worth Civils & Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout: Lenders that Have Closed 
Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/ 
public/resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
28 See, e.g., PAUL MUOLO & MATTHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: HOW WALL STREET 
CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS (2008); Charles W. Calomiris & Peter J. 
Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress for the Credit Mess, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 
2008, at A1; Alan Greenspan, Editorial, The Roots of the Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
12, 2007, at A1.  
29 See generally MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 28 (describing the complicated and often 
interconnected set of factors that led to the subprime collapse and the credit crisis). 
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have been nearly so fierce were it not for the failures of the credit ratings 
agencies.30
A. THE AMERICAN CREDIT RATINGS AGENCIES: THE DEBT MARKET’S 
TRIUMVIRATE 
 
This Comment provides an abridged version of the interesting history 
of the CRAs and the circumstances that resulted in our current credit ratings 
system.31  The ratings agencies’ primary role in the credit markets is to 
provide information about the creditworthiness of securities and other debt 
instruments that are bought and sold.32  The credit ratings industry has been 
dominated by three players—Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors 
Service, and Fitch Ratings—and until recently, they were the “only three 
with an official stamp of approval from the SEC, designated as nationally 
recognised statistical-rating organisations, or NRSROs.”33  These agencies 
are supposed to serve a crucial function to investors—that of gatekeepers—
a function in which they wholly failed leading up to the financial crisis.34
For any given corporation or security, the CRAs use information, 
including “the issuer’s quality of assets, its existing liabilities, its borrowing 
and repayment history and its overall business performance,” to generate a 
 
 
30 See, e.g., Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, Credit Ratings Failures: Causes and Policy 
Options, in MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: KEY ISSUES FOR THE 
G20, 129, 129 (2009), available at http://www.voxeu.org/reports/G20_ebook.pdf (“As the 
ongoing financial turmoil originated in the market for subprime mortgage-backed securities, 
much attention is currently directed at the flaws of the securitization process and particularly 
at the failures of the rating agencies (CRAs), which played a key role in this process. . . .”); 
FRANK PARTNOY, OVERDEPENDENCE ON CREDIT RATINGS WAS A PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE 
CRISIS 1 (2009) (presented at Eleventh Annual International Banking Conference) (“A 
primary cause of the recent credit market turmoil was overdependence on credit ratings and 
credit ratings agencies.  Without such overdependence, the complex financial instruments, 
particularly collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs), which were at the center of the crisis could not, and would not, have  
been created or sold.”), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/ 
Partnoy_Overdependence_Credit.pdf. 
31 For a more in-depth account of the ratings agencies, consider Frank Partnoy’s many 
works on the ratings industry.  See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial 
Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Ratings Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 619, 
704—10 (1999) [hereinafter Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert]; Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit 
Ratings Agencies Are Not Like Other Gate-Keepers, FIN. GATEKEEPERS 59, 64–68 (Yasuyuki 
Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006). 
32 See In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
33 Teather, supra note 5.  This Comment uses the term “NRSRO” to refer to the limited 
group of credit ratings agencies that qualify for the title. 
34 See Paul J. Davies et al., Reputations to Restore; Rating Agencies Come Under Ever 
Closer Scrutiny, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 22, 2008, at 11. 
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credit rating.35  These ratings provide investors a barometer to evaluate the 
risk and probability of repayment of a security.36  Investors are free to 
perform their own due diligence on most of the information available to the 
CRAs; however, the ratings agencies have access to some nonpublic 
information that gives them a distinct advantage.37  The CRAs have carved 
out a space in the market as specialized intermediaries, assessing risk based 
on both public and nonpublic information.38
The agencies take in specific information and process it according to 
specific protocols;
 
39 this assembly-line feature of the ratings industry 
provides a solid shield against criminal liability.  The analysts and 
executives can blame their own failures on the mechanics of their risk-
models, and the standardized process offers a promising method of 
defeating the mens rea requirement.40
Standard & Poor’s stipulates in its own materials that it will only give 
a credit rating “when there is adequate information available to form a 
credible opinion and only after applicable quantitative, qualitative, and legal 
analyses are performed.”
  But the agencies and their actors are 
not robotic creditworthiness machines; the ratings process is not purely a 
mechanical process in which XYZ input yields AAA output.  There are 
humans at the wheel. 
41  The courts have recognized that agencies “are 
expected to look beyond the financial reports in assessing an issuer.”42
 
35 Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, How Did Increased Competition Affect Credit Ratings? 
11 (Harvard Business School, Working Paper 09-051, Sept. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-051.pdf.  
  This 
36 Id. 
37 See Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, 
and Fear Lead to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1500 (1998) (noting that “the only 
reason that rating agencies are able to charge fees at all is because the public has enough 
confidence in the integrity of these ratings to find them of value in evaluating the riskiness of 
investments”). 
38 Becker & Melbourn, supra note 35, at 11–12. 
39 For example, before making a ratings decision, “S&P requires the following financial 
information from management [of an issuer], if possible: five years of audited financial 
statements; interim financial statements; operation and product descriptions; and draft 
registrations statements.  In addition, non-public information may be presented 
confidentially to the rating agencies to help them arrive at an appropriate rating.”  In re 
HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 637–38 (N.D. Ala. 2009). 
40 See infra subpart III.A. 
41 STANDARD & POOR’S, STANDARD & POOR’S CORPORATE RATING  
CRITERIA 9 (2006), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/ 
corporateratings_052007.pdf. 
42 In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. at 637–38 (citing Cammer v. Bloom, 
711 F. Supp. 1264 (D. N.J. 1989)) (relying on credit ratings in addition to the Cammer 
factors to evaluate the efficiency of the market for a security and determine on balance the 
viability of a class action claim under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act and Sections 
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Comment argues that the fundamentally qualitative aspects of the ratings 
industry justify criminal liability when a ratings agency recklessly 
manipulates the qualitative inputs.43
B. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND OTHER ISSUES WITH THE RATINGS 
AGENCY MODEL 
 
The credit ratings industry has taken substantial criticism as a system 
rife with perverse incentives and conflicts of interest.44  The ratings 
agencies clearly failed leading up to the subprime collapse; as a result, 
scholars have scrutinized the CRAs’ role in the market.45  Professor John C. 
Coffee of Columbia Law School provided a useful, non-exhaustive list of 
the major issues afflicting the ratings industry to the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.46  He identified five central 
problems: (1) the issuer-pays model, (2) the NRSROs’ immunities from 
liability, (3) the licensing power of the NRSROs, (4) the oligopoly of only 
three ratings agencies, and (5) the weak incentive to update ratings.47  Each 
of these issues raises doubts about the legitimacy of the current ratings 
system; considered together, they suggest that the industry needs complete 
reregulation and restructuring.48





10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act).  The court’s use of credit ratings here demonstrates an 
institutional dependence on the ratings agencies so deep-rooted that the judiciary builds the 
ratings agencies into its factor-analysis of efficiency. 
  Credit ratings agencies are paid by the issuers of 
43 S&P sets out some of the subjective criteria that go into a rating: “a thorough review of 
business fundamentals, including industry prospects for growth and vulnerability to 
technological change, labor unrest, or regulatory actions.”  STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 
41, at 9.  
44 See, e.g., Arthur Levitt Jr., Conflicts and the Credit Crunch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 
2007, at A15; Serena Ng & Aaron Lucchetti, Congress Takes on Credit Ratings—Ex-
Moody’s Analyst Says Inflated Ratings Continue, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2009, at C1, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125366267173132295.html. 
45 See, e.g., Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Ratings 
Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227 (2009). 
46 Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 70-72 (2008) (statement 
of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia  
Univ. Sch. of Law), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg50399/pdf/ 
CHRG-110shrg50399.pdf [hereinafter Coffee Testimony].  
47 Id. at 70–72. 
48 Partnoy, supra note 31, at 704.   
49 E.g., Levitt Jr., supra note 44, at A15 (“[C]redit ratings agencies—such as Moody’s 
Investor Service, S&P, and Fitch Ratings—are playing both coach and referee in the debt 
game.  They rate companies and issuers that pay them for that service.  And, in the case of 
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securities—an arrangement that immediately seems backwards because 
investors, not issuers, consume the ratings.  The CRAs did not always 
structure their operations as pay-for-services; they used to generate revenue 
from subscriptions.50  But in the 1970s, investor confidence plummeted in 
response to the unexpected bankruptcy of the Penn Central railroad; the 
issuers needed to assure investors that their debt instruments were still safe, 
low-risk assets, and issuers were willing to pay for those assurances.51  The 
ratings agencies responded by abandoning John Moody’s legacy of 
subscription service.52  And thus began the issuer-pays model that has the 
“watchdog paid by the persons they are to watch.”53  Empirical research 
suggests that the fees charged to issuers amount to upwards of 90% of the 
CRAs’ revenue.54  Moreover, the CRAs are exacerbating this conflict of 
interest by offering pre-issuing consulting services to the issuers on top of 
the traditional rating services.55  These consulting services are essentially 
trial runs that allow issuers to experiment and exploit the ratings models 
behind closed doors.56  It also leaves the system vulnerable to criminal 
conspiracy; without transparency, actors at both an issuer and a ratings 
agency can cooperate to create an inflated rating—or even just an 
investment-grade rating—that generates revenue for both the issuer and the 
ratings agency.57
The next major issue is limited competition: the ratings industry is 
controlled by a triumvirate.  Although the official group of NRSROs is no 
longer confined to the triumvirate, those three have solidified a position of 
superiority in the market.  Even though federal regulations allow other 
 
 
structured financial instruments which make it possible to securitize all those subprime 
mortgages, they help issuers construct these products to obtain the highest possible rating.”). 
50 See Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2006, 109 Cong. 2d Sess., Rpt. 109-
546, 8 (2006)  (“Originally the major rating agencies only received revenue from selling lists 
of their ratings to investors . . . [but] with the introduction of the copying machine, these 
ratings lists could be easily copied and disseminated; the agencies needed another source of 
revenue.”).  
51 See Lawrence J. White, The Credit Ratings Agencies: How Did We Get Here? Where 
Should We Go? 8 (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Seminar Paper), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/seminardocs/091112crediratingagencies.pdf. 
52 Id.  
53 Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 2. 
54 See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Ratings Agencies Are Not at All Like Other 
Gatekeepers 62 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. Of Law, Legal Studies Research Series, Research 
Paper No. 07-46 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257.  
55 See Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 72.  
56 Id.  
57 See Lynch, supra note 45, at 247 (“Issuers want high ratings, not necessarily accurate 
ratings.  The higher the securities rating, the less concern investors will have about payment 
default, the greater the liquidity, and the lower the issuers’ cost of capital.”). 
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ratings agencies to qualify as NRSROs, “[t]he federal government created 
the rating cartel, and the U.S. is as dependent on it as everyone else.”58  The 
history of ratings-agency legislation and regulation has resulted in a system 
that gives three agencies tremendous power.59
The next issue raised by Professor Coffee—the CRAs’ immunity from 
civil liability—has been at the heart of many proposals for regulatory 
reform.
  From the standpoint of an 
investor, it seems obvious that such tremendous power should come with 
substantial accountability.  A government-endorsed oligopoly should not be 
able systematically to mislead the entire investing public without risking 
criminal punishment. 
60  The ratings agencies enjoy statutory privileges that insulate them 
from the kinds of investor lawsuits that regularly target issuers, banks, and 
other market players.61  Furthermore, many courts continue to empower the 
agencies with a broadly construed First Amendment defense that treats the 
CRAs as publishers of constitutionally-protected opinions.62
 
58 See David Evans & Caroline Salas, Flawed Credit Ratings Agencies Reap Profits as 
Regulators Fail Investors, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=a6NdKd8CfR2A. 
  When issuers 
59 Congress has had opportunities to reconsider the structure of the ratings market and 
proactively open the market to competition.  For whatever reason, these opportunities have 
not done much to bust up the ratings triumvirate.  One potential competitor has argued that 
the political discourse itself is dominated by the existing powers.  For example, in 2002, 
when Congress addressed the ratings market after the Enron disaster, the Egan & Jones 
agency lodged the following complaint: 
We do not believe that investors’ interests are adequately represented in the composition of the 
Hearings on Credit Ratings Agencies or that there will be any meaningful change in the non-
independent partner monopoly that is the root cause of the failure to warn investors.  The 
majority of the panel is comprised of the current NRSRO’s, large security firms, large issuers, 
large investors (which are capable of doing their own research), associations representing large 
security firms (the SIA and Bond Market Association) and issuers (the Association for Finance 
Professionals) and large investors (the Investment Company Institute).  One of the two 
academics included is conflicted (Schwarcz’s research center is supported by S&P and the large 
security firms). 
Conspicuously absent are independent academics who are considered experts in the field such as 
Larry White of NYU and Frank Partnoy of Washington University, consumer and investor 
advocates such as the Consumer Federation of America, the Department of Justice and groups 
that have been hurt by the WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing and other failures. 
Letter from Sean J. Egan & W. Bruce Jones, Letter Re: Hearing on Credit Ratings Agencies 
Egan-Jones Rating Company, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Nov. 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm. 
60 See, e.g., Fact Sheet, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Strengthening Oversight of Credit 
ratings agencies, Open Meeting of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Sept. 17, 2009, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-200-factsheet.htm. 
61 Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 71. 
62 See Cnty. of Orange v. McGraw Hill Co., Inc., 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding 
that ratings are covered by the First Amendment); see also Evans & Salas, supra note 58 
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attempt to bring suit under a theory of defamation, the issuers “must show 
that the rating agencies relied on falsehoods because of actual malice and 
had actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of their 
claims.”63  The First Amendment has largely insulated the CRAs from civil 
liability to issuers.  The CRAs operate with remarkably little risk of liability 
given how high the stakes of their actions can be.64  “Put simply, if credit 
ratings agencies do not have to fear liability to investors, they have less 
incentive to be diligent or prudent.”65  Although there is a strong case for 
expanded civil liability, the criminal provisions this Comment recommends 
would provide a more effective solution without the risks of burdensome, 
inefficient investor lawsuits.66
The next issue that Coffee identified—the CRAs’ regulatory licensing 
function—focuses on how credit ratings have become mandatory for certain 
actions by institutional investors.
  The state, not investors, should police the 
ratings agencies. 
67  From this perspective, the ratings 
agencies “have thrived, profited, and become exceedingly powerful because 
they have begun selling regulatory licenses, i.e., the right to be in 
compliance with regulation.”68
 
(“The U.S. District Court in Santa Ana, California, ruled that the county would have needed 
to prove the rating company’s ‘knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth’ to 
win damages.”). 
  The issues raised by this regulatory 
licensing view amplify some of the aforementioned problems.  In particular, 
from this perspective we can see the irrationalities and dangers of an issuer-
63 Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach 
for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1055 (2009) (“This First 
Amendment hurdle has made it extraordinarily difficult to establish that rating agencies 
engaged in libel and has left issuers without legal recourse except in outlier cases.”); see also 
Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial 
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1688–92 (2008) (discussing how 2006 
legislation failed to address the almost complete immunity that the CRAs enjoy from tort 
liability). 
64 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, 107TH CONGRESS, FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT 
OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 82 (Comm. Print 2002), available at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/100702watchdogsreport.pdf (“SEC Rule 436, promulgated under the 
Securities Act, expressly shields NRSROs from liability under Section 11 of the Securities 
Act in connection with an offering of securities.  This means that NRSROs are not held even 
to a negligence standard of care for their work.”); Jonathan S. Sack & Stephen M. Juris, 
Rating Agencies: Civil Liability Past and Future, 233 N.Y. L. J. 88, Nov. 5, 2007 (“Despite 
the concerns reflected in this new legislation, NRSROs are largely insulated from liability.  
Notably, NRSROs are shielded from potential liability under § 11 of the Securities Act of 
1933, which otherwise imposes strict civil liability on underwriters, accountants, and others 
for materially false registration statements.”).   
65 Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 71. 
66 See infra subpart III.B. 
67 Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 71. 
68 See Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 31, at 711. 
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pays model.69
The last major problem is the lack of incentives to update ratings.
  Civil penalties are not a sufficient disincentive against 
falsified ratings.  If the issuer-pays model is to have any coherence, there 
needs to be a powerful set of disincentives that caution against 
conspiratorial misconduct between issuers, institutional investors, and the 
CRAs.  This Comment suggests that a stronger criminal law would have the 
capacity to increase stability if the issuer-pays model survives. 
70  
This issue feeds back into many of the others.  For instance, it highlights the 
flaws of an issuer-pays model: issuers obviously have no incentive to push 
for an update when it will result in a downgrade; moreover, the CRAs do 
not collect fees for updates so they have no financial incentive to be 
diligent.71  These issues compounded to create the flawed ratings system 
that precipitated the credit crisis.  As these issues are explored in the context 
of regulatory reform, it is hard to envision a civil regulatory regime that can 
adequately address the problems of the existing system.  Criminal 
provisions, unlike complex civil regulations, could provide an overarching 
disincentive structure that addresses the issues without burdening the 
system with the unpopular expense of civil regulatory compliance.72
C. THE RISE OF COMPLEX STRUCTURED FINANCE AND THE RATINGS 
AGENCIES’ FAILURE TO ADAPT 
 
The previous two subparts have set out some of the structural 
weaknesses of the credit ratings industry.  This subpart describes how the 
rapid growth of structured finance exploited and exposed those weaknesses, 
ultimately contributing to the subprime and credit crises.73
 
69 When the issuers pay the ratings agencies and the issuers need certain ratings in order 
to sell their debt instruments, the ratings agencies are put under intense pressure by the 
issuers (their primary source of revenue) to provide the necessary rating.  One interesting 
aspect of the CRAs’ regulatory licensing function is that it runs counter to the theory that 
ratings are merely published opinions constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.  
If ratings were merely opinions, institutional investors would not give the ratings agencies a 
licensing power. 
  The swift 
70 Coffee Testimony, supra note 46, at 72. 
71 Id.  
72 See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The 
Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 142–44, 152 (2006) (describing how issuers 
will seek the system with the optimal amount of regulation and how Sarbanes-Oxley risks 
driving out companies because of the inefficiently high costs of compliance). 
73 It has been suggested that the very creation of these increasingly complex structured 
finance products might be enough to establish liability under some theory of fraud.  See R. 
Christopher Whalen, Policy Brief, The Subprime Crisis—Cause, Effect, and Consequences 7 
(Networks Fin. Inst., Working Paper, Mar. 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113888 (“CDOs and other types of OTC derivatives blossomed 
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expansion of the markets for residential-mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) led to a debt market full of new 
types of investment products with unknown risk-metrics.74  Well before the 
financial meltdown, Warren Buffett referred to these new structured finance 
vehicles as “financial weapons of mass destruction.”75  CDOs are securities 
collateralized by a pool of asset-backed securities, for which the underlying 
collateral is primarily subprime residential mortgage loans.76  Rating 
complex securities and CDOs requires more sophisticated risk models; yet 
the ratings agencies willingly rated these experimental, untested products as 
quickly as the issuers could package them.77  The issuers were dependent on 
the ratings agencies because they needed a comprehensible risk-metric to 
successfully market these new investment products to investors.78
The details of the complex rating process for CDOs and asset-backed 
securities are beyond the scope of this Comment.  However, it is worth 
noting the role of credit enhancements in the ratings process.
 
79  Credit 
enhancements are cushions that supposedly prevent cataclysmic losses even 
in the event of extraordinarily weak market conditions.80  In determining 
the required level of credit enhancements, the ratings agencies supposedly 
assume “catastrophic losses on an order of magnitude of the Great 
Depression.”81
 
into hideously complex and opaque permutations, configurations that a smart trial lawyer 
might successfully argue were deliberately deceptive.”). 
  Credit enhancements are intended to function as a line of 
defense against particularly rough market conditions.  When the subprime 
crisis hit, credit enhancements failed to serve this defensive role.  Thus, the 
CRAs’ failures cannot be explained away by extreme market conditions; 
the constricted market simply exposed the inadequate disincentives 
governing the ratings industry. 
74 See id. (“[T]he rapid acceleration of financial technology created classes of assets that 
neither the Federal Reserve nor the other regulators ever anticipated—or understand even 
today.”). 
75 Buffett Warns on Investment ‘Time Bomb,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2003, 1:32 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2817995.stm. 
76 See Merrill Lynch, Annual Report 2009 (Form 10-K), at 27. 
77 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2047 (2007). 
78 See generally Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, How Did Increased Competition Affect 
Credit Ratings? (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-051, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1278150##. 
79 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 77, at 2047. 
80 See id. 
81 Id. 
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D. EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: A FOCUS ON AMENDING THE 
CIVIL REGULATORY SCHEME 
In light of the ratings agencies’ failures, most scholars agree that the 
“architecture of credit ratings agency regulation needs reform.”82  The 
proposals to date have focused on restructuring the civil regulatory 
regime.83  They address important deficiencies in the incentives that 
currently control the ratings agencies including the conflicts of interest and 
the problems of a three-player ratings industry.84
The important focus in both critiques and proposals for reform of the 
credit rating system is how the incentives operate.  One theorist suggests 
addressing the perverse incentives of a reputational capital model of ratings 
agencies by replacing it with a profit-disgorgement model.
  Some of these proposals 
could remedy many of the underlying issues with the ratings industry.  By 
exploring these promising but incomplete solutions through civil 
reregulation, I hope to demonstrate how criminal provisions could fill some 
of the gaps and provide a more functional regulatory framework. 
85  Briefly, the 
reputational capital model “holds that a well-functioning reputation 
mechanism will give ratings agencies optimum incentives for producing 
high-quality ratings.” 86  Ratings agencies develop a reputation based on the 
quality and accuracy of the ratings they produce; thus, they have an 
incentive to bolster that reputation by producing good-quality ratings.87
 
82 Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional 
Investor Perspective 7 (U. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 09-014, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430608.  
 
83 Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(b) Under the Securities Act of 
1933, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,114 (proposed Oct. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 220) 
(“[W]e are now exploring whether Rule 436(g) is still appropriate in light of the growth and 
development of the credit rating industry and investors’ use of credit ratings.”); see also 
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Rules and Forms at Issue in Removal of 
References to NRSRO Credit Ratings, (Sept. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-200-rulesformsaffected.htm. 
84 See, e.g., Norris, supra note 14, at C1 (“One clear improvement to the current structure 
of the debt markets would be to insist that all information shared with rating agencies be 
shared with the whole market.”).  
85 See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”:  
The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109.  
86 Id. at 113. 
87 Id. (“The underlying idea is that if investors determine that a rating agency’s ratings 
are of low quality, they will stop crediting the ratings, and the agency’s business will lose 
value.”).   
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But there are clearly problems with the reputational capital model.  For 
example, it is not obvious that investors are sensitive to reputation.88  In fall 
2009, a Moody’s analyst revealed that his employer gave a complex debt 
security a falsely inflated rating in January 2009, knowing full well that the 
underlying assets would be downgraded; as he predicted, the securities were 
put on review for downgrade shortly thereafter.89
The profit-disgorgement model is an alternative whereby the CRAs 
would have to give back the fees they received for a rating if the rating 
turned out to be unreasonably inaccurate.
  This occurred despite the 
already tarnished reputation of the ratings agencies.  If actors at the ratings 
agencies are continuing to provide favorable ratings without serious 
concern for inaccuracies and downgrades, then the reputational capital 
model is not functioning as an adequate check on misconduct. 
90  Although this proposal has 
some intellectual appeal, in practice it would almost certainly trigger 
expensive and inefficient conflicts between the issuers and the ratings 
agencies whenever things went awry.  Litigation would arise over whether 
fault was with the issuer or the ratings agency for inaccuracies, and whether 
those inaccuracies were unreasonable.  Adding systematic costs to the 
transactions between the ratings agencies and the issuers is not a cost-
effective mechanism to protect investors.91
In September 2009, the SEC approved a series of proposals designed 
to strengthen oversight of CRAs, “enhance disclosure and improve the 
quality of credit ratings.”
 
92  These proposals included new and improved 
disclosure requirements93 and a more rigorous set of reporting requirements 
to ensure compliance with the SEC regulations.94
A preeminent scholar of the credit ratings industry, Frank Partnoy, 
suggests that “Congress should create a new Credit Rating Agency 
Oversight Board (CRAOB) with the power to regulate rating agency 
practices, including disclosure, conflicts of interest, and rating 
 
 
88 See Cantor, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that the reputational capital model is 
entrenched but can only function properly if investors are able to rely on the high quality of 
the CRAs’ ratings). 
89 See, e.g., Ng & Lucchetti, supra note 44. 
90 See Hunt, supra note 85, at 182–83.  
91 But see id. at 194–95 (suggesting that the profits would be disgorged to investors, 
ultimately restoring at least part of their losses).  However, even if profits were disgorged to 
investors, the system costs of ongoing monitoring and regular litigation would be much more 
substantial than targeted criminal provisions that only resulted in the occasional high-profile 
suit. 
92 Fact Sheet, supra note 60.  
93 For example, it proposed substantially more disclosures about conflicts of interest.  See 
id. 
94 Id. 
2011] POLICING THE RATINGS AGENCIES 1021 
methodologies, as well as the ability to coordinate the reduction of reliance 
on ratings.”95  Partnoy’s theory is that the SEC is not currently in a position 
to provide the necessary oversight.  However, he agrees that “Congress 
could enhance the authority of the SEC to grant it similar power to oversee 
the rating business.”96  Back in 1999, Partnoy recommended that we replace 
credit ratings with credit spreads.97
Some go so far as to propose the elimination of all regulation of the 
credit-rating industry.
 
98  The thrust of this free-market argument is that the 
reputational capital model will self-regulate the ratings industry and the 
government does not need to interfere with regulations.  This radical theory 
mounts an attack both on the special treatment of NRSROs and the 
regulatory licensing function of the ratings agencies.99  The proposal 
theorizes that “[i]f a rating agency, unprotected by a government oligopoly, 
issues lousy ratings, it’s going to lose business.”100
Many of these proposals for reform are persuasive, particularly those 
directly addressing the conflicts of interest in the current system.  However, 
this Comment suggests that instead of a thorny web of civil regulations that 
are expensive from both a compliance and enforcement perspective, a 
narrowly tailored criminal law would deter the most problematic 
misconduct, restore investor trust in the markets, and ensure a much higher 
baseline standard of care.  Before exploring that proposal, it is worth 
discussing the inadequacies of the existing criminal law. 
  Although this theory 
might have some appeal, it would be dangerous and radical, raising issues 
of system-wide deregulation well outside the scope of this Comment. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Prosecutors have not been completely blind to the possibility of 
criminal suits against actors at the credit ratings agencies.101
 
95 Partnoy, supra note 
  For example, 
82, at 2. 
96 Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 31, at 704–10. 
97 See id.  Credit spreads are best understood as the difference in yield between U.S. 
federal government-issued debt securities and the subject private debt security.  See id. at 
704–09. 
98 See, e.g., Michael Sisk, A ‘Radical’ Answer to Credit-Ratings Conflict, U.S. BANKER 
July 2008, at 48, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/usb_issues/118_7/-357008-
1.html. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. (“The government should remove itself completely from the credit-rating business, 
stop deciding which company can and can’t rate a bond, and stop making institutions pay 
attention to rating agencies whose work may be shoddy.”). 
101 See, e.g., Press Release, Connecticut Attorney General’s Office, Attorney General 
Says His Broader Investigation into Credit Ratings Agencies Continuing Aggressively (June 
5, 2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/AG/cwp/view.asp?A=2795&Q=416772 (“The 
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the California attorney general launched a broad investigation into the 
ratings agencies.102
• Failed to conduct adequate due diligence in the rating process; 
  The goal of that investigation was to determine the 
CRAs’ “role in fueling the financial crisis” by exploring whether they: 
• Gave high ratings to particular securities when they knew or had 
reason to know that high ratings were not warranted; 
• Failed to comply with their own codes of conduct in rating certain 
securities; 
• Profited from giving inaccurate ratings to particular securities; 
• Made fraudulent representations concerning the quality or 
independence of their ratings; 
• Compromised their standards and safeguards for profits; 
• Failed to use statistical models that captured the risk inherent in 
subprime and other risky assets; or 
• Conspired with the companies whose products they rated to the 
detriment of investors.103
These questions set out a frame for possible criminal cases and provide 
a solid set of issues to consider in drafting a criminal statute targeting the 
ratings industry.
 
104  Former California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown 
is one of a handful with prosecutorial power who has explored the 
possibility of criminal suits.  This hesitation to pursue criminal charges 
suggests that those with prosecutorial power do not think criminal 
convictions are likely.105  Moreover, the driving force of the recent wave of 
litigation against the CRAs has been monetary recovery and not 
punishment.106
 
rating industry is highly concentrated, with three private, for-profit companies effectively 
controlling large swaths of our credit markets.  As I recently urged Congress and the SEC, 
this fatally flawed system must be fixed.  I proposed several specific reforms—reasonable, 
relatively simple steps that will go a long way toward making credit ratings more accurate 
and trustworthy.  My investigation continues and may result in legal action.”). 
  There are a number of theories of criminal liability that a 
102 Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Brown 
Launches Investigation into Credit Rating Agencies’ Role in Fueling Financial Crisis (Sept. 
17, 2009), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1808. 
103 Id. 
104 See infra notes 131–135 and accompanying text. 
105 See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 263 (“Rather than focus on past wrongdoing . . . [law 
enforcement agencies have] pushed for significant changes in the business practices of credit 
rating agencies, again avoiding the proof problems involved in proving criminal 
wrongdoing.”).  The dearth of lawsuits could also, however, suggest that those with 
prosecutorial power are simply exercising prosecutorial discretion in consideration of the 
time and expense required for these complex cases. 
106 See, e.g., Liz Rappaport & Nathan Becker, Ohio Files Suit Against Credit Raters, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2009, at B3 (describing a suit against the ratings agencies seeking 
recovery for massive losses to public pension funds). 
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prosecutor might consider under the existing law, but this Comment argues 
that these cases are weak at best, evincing the need for a targeted criminal 
law with some teeth to it. 
A. CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER EXISTING LAW 
A criminal prosecution against a CRA actor would be difficult on at 
least two major fronts: (1) causation and (2) mens rea.  Prosecutors could 
try to bring a wire fraud case, a case for fraudulent violation of SEC 
regulations, or a more general criminal fraud case at the state level.  In all 
cases, the theory of causation would be attenuated unless incriminating 
information came to the surface that conclusively correlated the ratings to 
investor decisions.  The mens rea requirement would be the highest hurdle 
for fraud charges requiring knowledge or intent.  The mens rea in a 
hypothetical prosecution against a CRA actor would be shrouded by (a) the 
complexity of these investment products and (b) market-wide risk-metric 
failures. 
1. Causation 
With civil suits moving forward against the CRAs, one might expect 
there to be a solid case for causation in the criminal context.107  However, 
the causation issues in a criminal case against an individual actor would be 
different because a prosecutor would have to connect the individual 
defendants’ actions to the harm.  In the civil suits, the plaintiffs can target a 
ratings agency broadly and can triumph on securities fraud claims without 
establishing any misconduct by specific actors at the ratings agencies.  
However, a generalized causation argument that might succeed in a civil 
suit would not suffice for a criminal prosecution against an individual.108
2. Mens Rea 
  It 
would be difficult to prove that an individual actor at the CRAs took any 
action that in itself rose to the level of criminal fraud. 
The mens rea requirement would be a formidable hurdle under the 
existing law and probably explains the absence of any prosecutions.109
 
107 See, e.g., In Re Moody’s Sec. Litig., 599 F.Supp.2d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
  
108 See Henderson v. Kibble, 431 U.S. 145, 151 (1977) (holding that “the Constitution 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime,” 
including causation). 
109 See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 228 (setting out the difficulty of establishing a mens 
rea as part of the reason for so few criminal cases in the subprime crisis). 
1024 DAVID A. MAAS [Vol. 101 
Proving mens rea is a difficult task that is at the heart of the criminal law.110  
The difficulties of establishing mens rea are particularly burdensome in 
complicated fraud cases like those that would arise in the credit ratings 
market.111
The assessments of accountants like Arthur Andersen can be tested.  If an accountant 
doesn’t follow GAAP, or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, his negligence 
can be checked, and he can be cast out of the profession—or prosecuted.  By contrast, 
ratings agencies, despite carrying the government’s imprimatur, each have their own 
unique methods of rating.  There is no standardized approach as there is in the 
accounting industry.  “They are masters of their own methodologies.  You have to 
prove their own methodologies are wrong. . . .”
  There are no obvious facts from which to establish mens rea in 
the ratings industry.  Without initiating an investigation, there is nothing 
that CRA actors do or produce that would indicate knowledge or intent.  
One commentator explains: 
112
The ratings agency analysts and executives can defend a criminal 
charge by professing reliance on their ratings models.  They can say that at 
worst they realized in hindsight that the models were inaccurate.  There is 
nothing in the actions of a CRA analyst or executive in rating a debt 
instrument that would help establish mens rea, aside from any outright 
admission of knowledge or intent. 
 
3. Theories of Liability 
A theory of liability in a potential case against a CRA actor would fall 
under the umbrella of fraud.113  A criminal prosecutor could try to develop 
the following general theory, varying somewhat by jurisdiction or based on 
the particular federal statute: criminal liability exists when (1) a ratings 
agency defendant (2) intended to defraud (3) by knowingly distributing 
false information, (4) expecting investors to rely on that false information, 
(5) which investors did rely on, (6) resulting in a loss to those investors.114
 
110 E.g., Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 
81 (1908) (“It is a fundamental principle of the criminal law, for which no authorities need 
be cited, that the doer of a criminal act shall not be punished unless he has a criminal 
mind.”). 
  
111 Cf. Ceresney, supra note 15, at 228 (“Even in situations where there was wrongdoing, 
the time and resources required to mount investigations and the burden of proving intent to 
defraud are formidable obstacles for prosecutors and regulators to surmount, except in the 
most straightforward of fraud cases.”). 
112 Michael Hirsh, Drop Moody’s into the Volcano, NEWSWEEK, (Sept. 30, 2009), 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/216486 (quoting a former Moody’s managing director). 
113 “Fraud” does not delineate a specific federal crime, but rather is a concept underlying 
a genus of crimes.  See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 731–34 
(1999). 
114 This general construction does not derive from a particular statute or common law 
rule, but a synthesis of elements in various statutes.  Cf. id. at 749–60. 
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The most difficult piece to prove in this general theory would be intent.  A 
prosecutor would have to convince a jury not only that a defendant was 
recklessly endangering investors but also possessed an intent to defraud. 
What charging offenses are available to prosecute fraud in these kinds 
of high-stakes cases?  One specific statutory theory of fraud that 
prosecutors might advance would be wire fraud.  The four elements of 
criminal wire fraud are the following: (1) the defendant voluntarily and 
intentionally devised or participated in a scheme to defraud another out of 
money, (2) the defendant did so with the intent to defraud, (3) it was 
reasonably foreseeable that interstate wire communications would be used, 
and (4) interstate wire communications were in fact used.115
The closest thing to a targeted statutory criminal charge under the 
existing law would flow from the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 (CRA Reform Act).
  Here, like in 
the general theory, a prosecutor would need to demonstrate an intent to 
defraud.  That high mens rea requirement protects the ratings agencies from 
federal prosecutors. 
116  Although there is no criminal charge explicitly 
defined in the statute, it sets the groundwork for potential criminal or 
criminal conspiracy charges against the CRAs.  The statute charges the SEC 
with regulating the ratings agencies, imposing specific requirements with 
respect to the conflicts of interest inherent in the ratings industry.117
The SEC has promulgated regulations, including SEC Rule 17g-5, 
which requires ratings agencies “to disclose and manage conflicts of interest 




[I]f the government can prove that some sort of tacit agreement existed between the 
investment banker and the credit ratings agency in which the banker would bring his 
deals to the rating agency in return for a good rating, the government is likely to argue 
  This regulation opens the door to charges of criminal 
conspiracy, as explained in one report: 
 
115 See United States v. Proffit, 49 F.3d 404, 406 (8th Cir. 1995).  Sometimes courts 
parse the cause of action into a different number of elements but these different constructions 
all amount to the same general requirements.  See, e.g., United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 
745, 771 (5th Cir. 1994) (parsing wire fraud into two essential elements: (1) a scheme to 
defraud, and (2) the use of, or causing the use of, interstate wire communications to execute 
the scheme); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1993) (setting out the 
wire fraud elements as (1) a scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses, (2) defendant’s 
knowing and willful participation in the scheme with intent to defraud, and (3) use of 
interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme). 
116 Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)). 
117 Id. 
118 Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Final Rules to Implement the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006, May 23, 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2007/2007-104.htm. 
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that it not only constitutes a conflict of interest but should be considered a criminal 
conspiracy. 
To prove a criminal conspiracy, the government need only prove the existence of an 
illegal act and an agreement to perform.  This is arguably easier to prove than an 
aiding-and-abetting violation, which requires proof of both knowledge and substantial 
assistance, thus potentially exposing both the rating agencies and investment banks to 
additional criminal charges.119
In order to successfully bring a case under SEC Rule 17g-5, a prosecutor 
would have to prove that the CRA actor intentionally conspired to withhold 
disclosure of conflicts of interest.  Some CRA agency executives have 
publicly admitted that conflicts at their agencies caused inaccuracies in the 
ratings: “Conflicts of interest were largely responsible for the disastrous 
performance of credit ratings agencies in assessing the risks of mortgage-
backed securities, two former high-ranking officials at Moody’s Investors 
Service and Standard & Poor’s said . . . in Congressional testimony.”
 
120
This admission would seem to bode well for a criminal case against 
the ratings agency executives.  Unfortunately, the admission is not as 
substantial as it seems at first blush.  The CRA executives have only 
admitted in hindsight that they realize how the conflicts of interest caused 
ratings agency failures.  In order to establish the mens rea for criminal 
conspiracy, a prosecutor would need to show that the defendants had the 
mens rea at the time the alleged CRA misconduct occurred. 
 
What about those analysts who sent what looked like smoking-gun 
emails back and forth about the ratings agency system being a well-
constructed house of cards?121  Standing alone, those emails seem to impute 
a mens rea of at least knowledge with respect to the ratings agencies’ false 
disclosures.  What is stopping these emails from at least getting a criminal 
case before a jury?  The attenuated causal connection between the emails 
and the harm makes the case against these analysts weak at best.  The CRA 
Reform Act does not place a positive duty on all ratings agency actors to 
disclose their knowledge of conflicts of interest.122
 
119 WILLIAM R. “BILLY” MARTIN, ET AL., THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS: SOMEBODY 
HAS TO PAY 4 (2009), available at http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/ 
8d710730-7bb5-4ee0-88d0-84d1bed596fe/Presentation/NewsAttachment/2eaf4704-0967-
459e-a838-40219a20068f/Reprint_Martin.pdf. 
  There is no Good 
Samaritan law that imposes criminal sanctions for failing to report the 
misconduct of others.  Thus, unless the analysts intended to act in 
furtherance of a fraud crime, they cannot be held liable for complicity or 
120 Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Ratings Agency Heads Grilled by Lawmakers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at B1. 
121 See Taylor, supra note 1. 
122 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006) (placing no affirmative duty on the CRAs). 
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conspiracy.  Prosecutors seem to have no solid case against any actor at the 
ratings agencies, despite institutional knowledge that false and misleading 
ratings were placing unjustifiable risks on investors.  The absence of a 
viable criminal case fails to capture the magnitude of harm caused by the 
CRAs and the central importance of credit ratings to investors. 
4. Mistake of Fact Defense and Other Hurdles 
Another hurdle that a prosecutor faces is a mistake of fact defense.123  
Mistake of fact allows a defendant to defeat a charge if he honestly believed 
in a set of facts that would prevent him from forming the requisite mens rea 
required to constitute the crime.124  An agency analyst would be able to 
argue that he honestly believed the ratings models were functional or that 
the ratings were reasonably accurate, which would defeat the requisite mens 
rea of knowledge or intent required for a fraud crime under the existing 
law.  The CRAs could also argue that they were ignorant of undisclosed, 
material information from the issuers.125
Another issue is willful blindness.  The ratings agencies can probably 
survive a criminal prosecution even if there is a showing of willful 
blindness.  Unlike public companies, the CRAs are immune from the 
disclosure requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).
 
126  SOX 
put in place a much stronger set of criminal disincentives for corporate 
executives;127 however, those laws do not cover the ratings agencies.128
By no means is this an exhaustive review of the theories of liability, 
strategies, or defenses that would arise in a criminal case against a CRA 





123 Mistake of fact is a longstanding doctrine that allows defendants to defeat liability by 
arguing subjective misapprehension of a material fact.  See generally Keedy, supra note 
  More importantly, these issues demonstrate the substantial 
difficulty that prosecutors face in bringing criminal suits. 
110, 
at 81–88. 
124 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (1985). 
125 See Keedy, supra note 110, at 81 (“One who commits a criminal act under mistake of 
fact has a defense, because he has wrong or insufficient data for reasoning.”). 
126 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
127 Michael D. Silberfarb, Justifying Punishment for White-Collar Crime: A Utilitarian 
and Retributive Analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 95, 98 (2004). 
128 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 tit. VII (expanding white-collar criminal law and 
increasing sentences, but targeting corporate actors without including CRA actors). 
129 For instance, there could be charges of intentional misstatements or omissions, which 
can constitute federal criminal violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).  The mens rea 
required for a conviction under this statute is still intent. 
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B. PROPOSED SOLUTION: A NARROWLY TAILORED CRIMINAL LAW 
ADDRESSING THE ISSUES AFFLICTING THE RATING INDUSTRY 
Congress should consider enacting new criminal provisions controlling 
the ratings agencies.  There will undoubtedly be substantial opposition from 
the CRAs themselves and probably some issuers who have been colluding 
with the agencies.  But Congress should find support from securitizers, 
investors, regulators, and the public.  The packagers of investment products 
will be able to market their products more vigorously based on their ratings, 
which will be substantially more meaningful if the CRAs face significant 
criminal disincentives.  Moreover, the risk of investor lawsuits will 
decrease if issuers, trustees, and investment managers can point to the 
ratings as a more reliable measure of risk.  Investors will benefit in two 
ways from criminal regulation of the CRAs: (1) they will have more 
confidence in the ratings because they know the stakes are higher for 
analysts and executives at the CRAs and (2) they will have the opportunity 
to push for retributive justice if future misconduct causes losses. 
The criminal CRA provisions could be part of a freestanding criminal 
statute or integrated with a civil regulatory statute like SOX.130
Title I—Credit Ratings Accountability 
  The statute 
could build off of the following proposed core provisions: 
§ 1.01—Management Accountability 
(1) All credit ratings provided by a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization must be approved by two personnel, including at least one 
management-level individual. 
(2) Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations must keep records 
of which personnel certified each credit rating for a period not less than 10 
years. 
Title II—Criminal Credit Rating Fraud 
§ 2.01 Criminal Credit Rating Fraud 
Whoever recklessly certifies, or attempts to certify a falsely inflated or falsely 
depressed credit rating to be published by a Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization shall be criminally fined or imprisoned not more than 15 
years,131
These provisions provide a basic skeleton with two important features.  
First, the requisite mens rea is expressly articulated as recklessness, which 
 or both. 
 
130 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codifying both 
civil and criminal provisions in various sections of 15 and 28 U.S.C.). 
131 A growing literature focusing on proportionality of sentences highlights the 
importance of legislative limits on sentences.  See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Punishment 
Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 73 (2005). 
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will help solve the proof problem that prosecutors face.132  The lower 
threshold of mens rea should incentivize more prosecutors to at least 
investigate the ratings agencies.  The second important feature is the dual-
certification requirement; this requirement will force management at the 
CRAs to take accountability for ratings along with analysts.  It should 
provide a disincentive to management-level misconduct that 
counterbalances the existing conflicts of interest and financial incentives to 
inflate ratings.133  As a result, all published ratings will carry a signature, 
comparable to an executive’s signature on an SEC filing.134
This criminal law is narrowly tailored to exclusively cover NRSRO 
actions, because the ratings agencies serve a unique role in the markets.  
Congress should not lump the ratings agencies into the same statutory 
regime as issuers, banks, trustees, investment companies, and other players 
in the financial sector.  The news media chose a narrative of the financial 
crisis that demonized “Wall Street” as though there were a unified mob of 
villains that walked the streets of Manhattan.  A broad criminal statute 
would not adequately address the issues unique to the ratings industry: the 
ratings industry needs a narrow but robust set of criminal disincentives in 
place. 
 
The complete provisions should flesh out the proposed frame and set 
out what types of quantitative and qualitative information a ratings agency 
must consider before rating a debt instrument.  However, these 
requirements should not serve as a closed set of inputs for credit ratings.  
Overregulation would stifle innovation in both the ratings industry and the 
financial sector, while undermining the functioning of a competitive ratings 
market.  The value of a credit rating continues to depend on the reputational 
capital of the ratings agency that issued it.  If a ratings agency’s risk-models 
were effectively government-controlled, investors would not be able to 
differentiate between the different ratings agencies.  Furthermore, a fixed 
 
132 Cf. Ceresney, supra note 15, at 252 (arguing that there is already enough evidence for 
prosecutors to meet a knowledge or intent requirement). 
133 Cf. Lynch, supra note 45, at 254 (“[A] recent SEC report concluded that although 
analysts’ salaries at the three largest NRSROs were generally based on seniority and 
experience, bonuses were based on individual performance and the overall success of the 
firm.  The more business a credit rating agency solicits, the more successful and profitable it 
becomes.”) (citations omitted). 
134 Courts have been resistant to imputing scienter from a signature.  See In re Ceridian 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the possibility that an 
executive’s signature could be sufficient to establish scienter by asserting that “[a]llegations 
that accounting errors were discovered months and years later do not give rise to a strong 
inference that the certifications were knowingly false when made”).  However, this 
Comment proposes a mens rea of recklessness for CRA criminality, which is lower than 
scienter.  The signature would at least be strong evidence of the required mental state when 
taken in conjunction with gross inaccuracy of a credit rating. 
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set of inputs might not be able to capture the risks of new debt instruments, 
like the structured investment vehicles and CDOs that were at the heart of 
the subprime and credit crises. 
Instead, the provisions should provide a baseline or core set of 
requirements from which analysts can construct risk-models within the 
statutory framework.  The proposed criminal offense will specifically target 
and control these risk analytics.  The ratings agencies should be held to a 
standard of conduct that represents their paramount importance in 
disseminating widely consumed evaluative information. 
These criminal provisions will provide systematic legitimacy to the 
ratings industry, which in turn will bolster the whole financial sector.  The 
implementation and enforcement of strict criminal sanctions for misconduct 
at the CRAs will restore investor trust.  Investor confidence is crucial to 
economic recovery and market stability going forward.135  Furthermore, as 
the financial sector begins to regain its footing, it will begin to innovate 
again, which could reintroduce the risks of untested new investment 
products.  In order for this innovation to succeed, investors will need to rely 
on the ratings agencies to perform their role as gatekeepers.136
C. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNISHMENT 
  These 
proposed criminal provisions would help stimulate economic growth by 
promoting investor confidence.  Although a strict new civil regulatory 
framework could provide some of the same deterrent value, compliance and 
enforcement would be expensive and burdensome.  Criminal disincentives 
provide powerful disincentives for wrongdoing without the expense of 
regulatory compliance. 
Under the existing law, a criminal conviction would be an expensive 
long shot.  Neither the foregoing theoretical analysis137 nor the empirical 
evidence (the absence of any successful prosecutions)138
 
135 See Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial Re-
regulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2009) (“Trust acts as a lubricant and reduces the 
transaction costs associated with economic conduct; its presence makes economic activity 
more efficient and permits actors to focus on wealth generation rather than wealth 
preservation.”). 
 supports bringing 
136 See Lynch, supra note 45, at 304 (“In a world of increasing complexity and opacity, 
investors may find it increasingly difficult to engage in their own risk assessments, and, even 
if they could do so, for all of them to do so would be increasingly inefficient.  Rather, 
investors may continue to rely on rating agencies, financial analysts, and other informational 
proxies to provide reliable information about the risks and values of securities. . . .”). 
137 See supra subpart III.A. 
138 See, e.g., Ceresney, supra note 15, at 263–67 (noting that state securities regulators 
have focused on prospective civil reregulation but avoided pursuing criminal cases for past 
abuses). 
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criminal charges against actors at the ratings agencies.  But does that mean 
criminal liability should not be imposed?  Is the criminal law too forgiving?  
Or did the misconduct at the ratings agencies simply not rise to the level of 
criminality?  Answering these questions requires an exploration of the 
normative theories of punishment.  Most justifications for punishment fall 
into one of two camps: retribution and utilitarianism.139
But is criminal punishment of ratings agency misconduct the best 
solution for the credit markets?  Some scholars, particularly optimal penalty 
theorists,
  Both of those 
theories support criminal punishment of misconduct at the ratings agencies. 
140 would probably contest the value of incarceration for this kind 
of wrongdoing.141
1. Retributive Justice 
  However, given the tremendous risks associated with 
ratings agencies’ actions and the heated public outcry at their failures, 
incarceration would at the very least provide some cathartic value above 
and beyond monetary fines or civil compensatory and punitive damages. 
The magnitude of harm that can result from wrongdoing at the ratings 
agencies should make criminal punishment a just desert for wrongdoers.  
Retribution is a theory of punishment that appeals to “the idea that 
punishment is directed at imposing merited harm upon the criminal for his 
wrong.”142  Under a retributive theory of punishment, putting a ratings 
agency actor on trial and imposing criminal punishment should only happen 
if that punishment, in and of itself, is warranted.143
 
139 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03[A] (3d ed. 
2001). 
  One of the many 
frustrations of the financial crisis has been a lack of accountability.  From 
this standpoint, punishing the ratings agencies for misconduct that caused 
catastrophic losses seems to fill the void.  The markets themselves have not 
140 Optimal penalty theory was introduced by Gary Becker and postulates that the 
criminal law should seek to deter illegal behavior in the most efficient way.  See Gary S. 
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 207–09 
(1968). 
141 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1980) (advocating for fines instead of imprisonment in many white-
collar cases); Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L. J. 2017, 2019–20 (1992).  
142 Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an 
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2000); see 
also Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The 
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 120 (2008) (“Retribution justifies 
punishment because it is deserved due to wrongful conduct.”). 
143 See Lord Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
66 (Ronald M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (discussing how retribution is justified as an embodiment 
of the public perception of moral accountability). 
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inflicted damage on the CRAs: “Despite warnings from industry Jeremiahs 
and calls for change from Washington, Wall Street is betting the ratings 
services will avoid the radical reforms their most ardent critics are urging.  
The industry, the thinking goes, will remain much as it was before: 
protected, profitable and, detractors say, rife with conflicts.”144
If the ratings agencies continue to profit without suffering any public 
penalties, there will remain a wound in the public consciousness, one that 
might heal if the ratings agencies are punished. 
 
After Enron and other massive corporate scandals of the early 2000s, 
the government pushed for sweeping regulatory reform.  Although the 
CRAs were investigated, they “were a low priority after the banks, 
accountancy firms and officers of the companies where fraud [had] been 
uncovered.”145
2. Specific Deterrence 
  This time, the ratings agencies cannot hide behind Kenneth 
Lay or Charles Keating. 
If any individual actor in the credit ratings market spent time in jail, 
the threat of further punishment would promote honest behavior and 
specifically deter future fraud.  Specific deterrence is a utilitarian theory of 
punishment grounded in preventing repeat offenses by the same 
individual.146  Targeted criminal provisions would deter future misconduct 
by the CRA actors who played a role in the current crisis.  A federal 
criminal statute would vastly reduce the risk of CRA actors engaging in the 
same kind of questionably fraudulent activity that precipitated or at least 
amplified the credit crisis.  The threat of jail time is a powerful disincentive 
to all individuals, including the affluent, because it deprives citizens of their 
liberties.147
Congress could incorporate language into the statute that makes it 
clear the new laws are intended to deter the kind of misconduct that 
precipitated the credit crisis.  Courts almost always interpret statutory laws 
  Undoubtedly, actors at the ratings agencies would quickly 
become aware of new criminal provisions, and it would not take a 
discerning eye to determine the intent of those provisions.  Thus, the 
enactment of a criminal statute governing the ratings agencies would 
provide specific deterrence almost immediately. 
 
144 David Gillin, In Rating Agencies, Investors Still Trust, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at 
B1. 
145 Teather, supra note 5. 
146 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1997). 
147 See, e.g., Ernest Van Den Haag, The Criminal Law as a Threat System, 73 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 769, 770–72 (1982) (addressing social scientists’ challenges to the theory 
that punishment deters future misconduct by declaring that “the deterrent effectiveness of 
threats per se can hardly be questioned”). 
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as only prospectively applicable.148  Moreover, the Constitution prohibits ex 
post facto laws—laws that criminalize conduct prior to the enactment of the 
law.149
3. General Deterrence 
  Thus, a federal criminal law would not open the floodgates for 
prosecutors to go after past misconduct.  However, if Congress articulated 
its intent to specifically proscribe the kind of conduct that the CRAs 
engaged in during the credit crisis, the statute would effectively put the 
CRAs on notice.  The ratings agencies would need to adapt their practices 
and procedures to avoid criminal liability. 
There should be stricter criminal provisions in the credit ratings market 
because the threat of criminal sanctions is a powerful deterrent to white-
collar actors.150  General deterrence is a utilitarian theory that hypothesizes 
that punishment prevents future crimes on a system-wide basis.151  Criminal 
punishment sends a clear message: our society will not tolerate a specific 
kind of misconduct.152  The power of that message provides a justification 
for punishment as general deterrence.153
 
148 Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719, 
1736 (2006) (“Because retroactivity is disfavored in the law, statutes will be construed to 
apply prospectively unless Congress has specifically said otherwise.”) (citation omitted). 
  General deterrence is particularly 
potent in high-profile criminal cases.  As one journalist put it: “[H]igh-
profile prosecution deters white-collar crime.  White-collar criminals have a 
much larger stake in society and are therefore tractable.  They see ex-Tyco 
149 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed.”). 
150 Although some argue criminal fines are 
perhaps the most efficient and effective means of deterring corporate crime and expressing 
society’s condemnation . . . Congress must supplement these fines with other forms of 
punishment [or else] potential offenders will view the fines as a mere tax. . . .  [I]n order to 
contribute to a change in corporate culture, the punishment must indicate society’s condemnation 
and a mere tax would not perform this function. 
Silberfarb, supra note 127, at 102–03 (citations omitted). 
151 See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. 
L. REV. 949, 949–51 (1966); see also John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One 
Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1336 (2009) 
(“[One] school of thought argues that the purpose of punishment is deterrence, which 
involves inflicting an evil on a wrongdoer to discourage others from committing similar 
wrongful acts.”). 
152 See Andenaes, supra note 151, at 950. 
153 See DRESSLER, supra note 139, at § 2.03[B] (noting that from the perspective of 
general deterrence the goal is “to convince the general community to forego criminal 
conduct in the future”).  In regulating the credit ratings market, this goal is slightly narrower: 
to convince the community of actors involved in the ratings process—issuers, CRAs, et al.—
to forego wrongdoing in the future.  Cf. id. 
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CEO Dennis Kozlowski rotting away in Sing Sing, and they don’t want to 
be like him.”154
In theory, there has been a trend towards tougher sentencing guidelines 
and less lenient criminal punishment of white-collar criminals.
 
155  In many 
areas of white-collar crime, the number of federal suits has dropped 
substantially in recent years, which might indicate that the more draconian 
sentencing guidelines are successfully deterring white-collar crime.156
In the case of the ratings agencies, the second possibility is unlikely 
because prosecutors have actively investigated the CRAs.
  It 
could also indicate that (1) white-collar criminals have adapted their 
misconduct to evade criminal violations, (2) prosecutors have intentionally 
or arbitrarily decided to bring fewer white-collar cases, or (3) despite the 
harsh sentencing guidelines, the substantive law is too soft on white-collar 
crime. 
157
Creating a clear set of criminal provisions targeted at the CRAs will 
strengthen the entire market for debt products and deter misconduct 
throughout the financial sector.  If actors at the ratings agencies are wary of 
the risks of criminal liability, they will project that awareness when 
interacting with issuers, investors, and others in the market.  This infectious 
vigilance will foster a heightened respect for the looming fist of the law and 
promote rigorous compliance.  Although the risk of civil liability can also 
generally deter misconduct, the possibility of losing one’s liberty provides 
an incentive on an entirely different order of magnitude. 
  Both the first 
and the third possibilities suggest that Congress should seriously consider 
restructuring the substantive criminal law governing the ratings agencies.  
The ratings agencies could very well have adapted their behavior to exploit 
the weak criminal law.  Regardless of whether the CRAs have knowingly 
circumvented the law, the law itself is far too soft.  The ratings agencies 
wield huge amounts of power in credit markets—if anything, the law 
should be overly protective of investors. 
 
154 Jesse Eisinger, Making Sense of the Credit Debacle, SLATE MAG. (Mar. 3, 2009 11:36 
AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2212480/entry/2212685/. 
155 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 21–25 (1988) (noting the 
penalty increases for white-collar offenders). 
156 The number of federal criminal suits for securities and exchange fraud in 2008 was 
actually 35% lower than the number in 2005.  See David Z. Seide & Brian M. White, Don’t 
Give Agencies Criminal Power—Consolidating Criminal and Civil Authority Is an Extreme 
Departure and Is Bound to Create More Problems, NAT’L L.J., (June 8, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431252200&slreturn= 
1&hbxlogin=1  (“There were only 66 federal criminal cases brought for securities and 
exchange fraud in 2008, down from 101 cases in 2005.”). 
157 See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 101. 
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4. The Trend Toward Stricter White-Collar Criminal Law 
When the Enron scandal came to light in 2001, it catalyzed a 
movement to clean up corporate behavior that led to a number of systematic 
changes.158  One of those changes was an increase in prison sentences for 
white-collar crimes.159  The United States Sentencing Commission 
overhauled the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, targeting white-collar 
crime.160  The sentences for fraud-related white-collar crimes increased 
substantially both on paper and in practice.161  This development was 
embraced by the investing public as a recognition “that white collar crimes 
pose a threat to the country’s social and economic fabric as significant as 
that of organized crime and narcotics trafficking.”162
The Enron debacle justified a stricter and harsher criminal law 
controlling the boardrooms of public companies.
 
163  Similarly, the credit 
crisis justifies a more exacting and forceful criminal law controlling the 
ratings agencies.  Congress has already attempted to reregulate the civil 
liability system in the credit ratings industry to no avail.164
 
158 John Kroger describes six major positive developments triggered by the Enron 
disaster: (1) increased prison sentences for white-collar crime, (2) formation of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, (3) a new bar on auditing companies providing 
consulting services, (4) stricter rules governing Special Purpose Entities, (5) efforts to reduce 
conflicts of interests, and (6) more resources for the SEC.  See John R. Kroger, Enron, 
Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 
114–19 (2005). 
  The credit crisis 
showcased investors’ vulnerabilities.  As investment products become 
increasingly sophisticated, investors become increasingly reliant on the 
159 See Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: 
An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 7 (2001) (describing how the revised 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines post-Enron increased penalties for many white-collar crimes). 
160 See Kroger, supra note 158, at 115. 
161 Id. at 115 n.272. 
162 Id. at 115. 
163 Although SOX has been subject to critical commentary, most of the criticism focuses 
on the expensive and complicated civil regulations.  See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Does the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 239–51 (2009) (discussing the 
pushback caused by the vast and sometimes crippling expense of SOX compliance).  This 
Comment is not suggesting a complex civil regulatory framework for the CRAs; on the 
contrary, this Comment suggests tailored criminal provisions could provide more powerful 
disincentives than a complicated set of civil regulations. 
164 See Ceresney, supra note 15, at 265 (“Despite [post-Enron] reforms, similar criticism 
of ratings agencies has emerged during the current credit crisis, which superheated in July 
2007, when the largest agencies announced plans to downgrade hundreds of bonds backed 
by subprime residential mortgages. . . .  The ratings downgrades spooked an already nervous 
market, as investors fled stocks and low-quality bonds.”). 
1036 DAVID A. MAAS [Vol. 101 
ratings agencies to analyze credit risk.165  When those ratings proved 
hollow promises of stability, investors rightfully expressed discontent at the 
state of the credit ratings system.166
5. Overcriminalization Concerns Should Not Affect Regulation of White-
Collar Crime 
  The stakes are too high to allow the 
ratings agencies to operate without a powerful disincentive scheme.  Civil 
liability has proved an inadequate disincentive.  The most effective 
disincentive scheme would include targeted criminal provisions that (1) 
deter wrongdoing and (2) justifiably punish high-risk misconduct. 
The overarching goal of this Comment is to recommend a targeted 
expansion of the federal criminal law that deters misconduct at the ratings 
agencies.  This Comment would be remiss not to address a body of 
scholarly literature in recent years describing a perceived problem: 
overcriminalization.167
The persuasive force of overcriminalization arguments is much weaker 
in the context of white-collar crime.
  This Comment admittedly encourages Congress to 
consider an increase in criminalization in the ratings market.  However, 
overcriminalization concerns should not carry the day, given how centrally 
important credit ratings are to the integrity of the financial markets. 
168  Concerns about prison 
overcrowding and racially distorted criminal conviction data are not present 
in the white-collar arena.169
 
165 See Cantor, supra note 
  Although some might consider violent crimes 
21, at 4 (highlighting the importance of integrity in the credit 
ratings market because of investor reliance on the high quality of the CRAs’ ratings). 
166 Ceresney, supra note 15, at 265 (“Investors complained bitterly that delinquencies in 
residential mortgages had been rising for months prior to the ratings downgrades, and that 
S&P and Moody’s were too slow in correcting the excessively high ratings that had been 
placed on many classes of bonds backed by subprime mortgages during the housing 
boom.”). 
167 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of 
Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005). 
168 See Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and 
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 780 (2005) (stating that 
overcriminalization is much less likely to occur in the white-collar context because there is 
much less white-collar enforcement). 
169 In an article analyzing the anti-criminalization movement, Darryl Brown notes the 
following: 
There is a wide scholarly consensus that American incarceration rates are excessive and racially 
skewed and that sentencing policies are overly rigid.  Expansion of substantive criminal law 
deserves little blame for this.  The dramatic growth in incarceration rates is mostly of a function 
of new sentencing laws rather than new crimes, coupled with greater enforcement of mostly 
long-standing, familiar crimes, not outdated ones with little popular support. 
Darryl K. Brown, Rethinking Overcriminalization 51 (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 
No. 995, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/995. 
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categorically more troublesome, white-collar crime can wreak widespread 
economic havoc on the American public in a way that an individual street 
crime cannot.170
IV. CONCLUSION 
  White-collar criminal provisions provide a check on the 
powerful monetary incentives that can motivate white-collar crime.  The 
existence of powerful criminal disincentives in the financial sector shields 
the American public from the corruptive forces of greed and the 
catastrophic losses that can result from wrongdoing.  The ratings agencies 
provide a prime example of how misconduct in a white-collar setting can 
lead to cascading and devastating harms.  The traditional 
overcriminalization arguments do not substantially caution against 
increasing criminal liability in this arena. 
Congress should seriously consider restructuring the criminal law 
controlling the CRAs.  In the past decade, the ratings agencies have played 
a major part in two waves of massive investor losses: the accounting frauds 
of the early 2000s, and the subprime and credit crises.  The stakes have 
been exceptionally high, and yet the CRAs and all of their underlying actors 
have escaped without defending a single criminal prosecution.  The ratings 
agencies continue to enjoy immunities and privileges despite their 
complicity in the worst financial meltdown since the Great Depression.  
Congress needs to address this lack of accountability and safeguard 
investors from further abuse. 
In the scholarly discourse surrounding mass incarceration, many 
liberal academics are demanding that policymakers and politicians rethink 
the penal system.  At the same time as this movement for more 
humanitarian social justice on the streets, there has been a push for more 
stringent and unforgiving punishment of high-stakes white-collar crime.  
Despite the concerted advocacy for more corporate and white-collar 
accountability, the criminal law has not succeeded in disincentivizing 
egregious corporate misconduct.  A clear example of the criminal law’s 
failure is the absence of criminal prosecutions for misconduct by the CRAs.  
From the standpoints of both retributive justice and deterrence, the state 
 
170 See Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should 
Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 77, 78 (2010).  Meeks makes the case that: 
Corporate and white-collar crimes generate significant costs to the American public.  These 
crimes not only result in direct monetary losses for innocents—such as employees of 
corporations who lose significant value from their pension and retirement plans or even their 
jobs—but they also discourage further investment in financial markets.  Such a reduction of 
capital can stifle an economy and result in job loss. 
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
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would be justified in criminally punishing this kind of misconduct.  
However, the existing law fails to provide sufficiently strict criminal laws. 
There are substantive hurdles in the criminal law that obstruct the just, 
criminal punishment of misconduct at the CRAs.  Under the existing law, 
the ability to impose criminal sanctions on CRA actors who engage in high-
risk misconduct is frustrated by a mens rea requirement of knowledge or 
intent.  CRA actors can hide behind a shield of complexity.  The CRAs 
should be held to a different standard that acknowledges the importance of 
an honest, unconflicted market for ratings.  A mens rea of recklessness will 
put the CRAs on notice that rubber-stamp ratings will no longer fly under 
the prosecutorial radar.  Moreover, a statute criminalizing misconduct 
underlying the credit crisis will restore investor trust by promising more 
stringent punishment of wrongdoing. 
The future of the credit ratings industry hangs in the balance.  
Congress must decide how to address the inadequacies of the existing 
regulatory framework.  An expanded civil liability system that opens the 
door to investor suits against the CRAs will only further clog the federal 
courts.  Civil regulations and the associated compliance and enforcement 
would be unduly expensive and burdensome.  On the other hand, a 
narrowly tailored set of criminal provisions could provide a powerful 
disincentive against misconduct at the CRAs without the expense of 
regulatory compliance.  The absence of a targeted federal criminal law 
governing the ratings agencies was a get-out-of-jail-free card for the CRAs 
in the credit crisis.  But this is no game of Monopoly—Congress should 
take those cards out of the deck.  
